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 This volume brings together leading scholars on populist political 
communication and truly demonstrates the relevance for populism as a 
research area within political communication research. The book provides 
a substantial leap forward in our empirical and theoretical understanding 
of populist political communication through comparative empirical 
evidence on its consequences. Rarely does a volume present such rich and 
original comparative empirical evidence. This volume should be on the 
shelf of any scholar interested in populism and political communication, as 
it lays the foundation for future studies within this emerging research fi eld. 
 — Erik Knudsen, Department of Information Science 
and Media Studies, University of Bergen 
 The book addresses crucial questions about how populist messages are 
perceived by politicians and journalists and what eff ect they might have 
on target audiences. It is a must-read for everyone interested in studying 
populism. 
 —Otto Eibl, Department of Political Science, 
Masaryk University 
 If populism often (but not always) goes along with nationalism and the 
rejection of expertise, this is a decidedly non-populist book: based on 
the international collaboration of experts from all over Europe and on 
elaborate comparative empirical research. And it is ‘populist’ in the best 
sense: accessible and enlightening also to the uninitiated (while essential 
to everyone in the fi eld), and with a bit of critical advice to journalistic 
and political elites. 
 —Benjamin Krämer, Department of Communication 
Science and Media Research, LMU Munich 

 Communicating Populism 
 The studies in this volume conceptualize populism as a type of political 
communication and investigate it comparatively, focusing on (1) politicians’ and 
journalists’ perceptions; (2) media coverage; and (3) eff ects on citizens. 
 This book presents fi ndings from several large-scale internationally comparative 
empirical studies, funded by the European Cooperation in the fi eld of Scientifi c and 
Technical Research (COST), focusing on communication and the media within the 
context of populism and populist political communication in Europe. The studies 
are based on comparative interview studies with journalists and politicians, a 
large-scale comparative content analysis, and a comparative cross-country 
experiment using nationally representative online surveys over 15 countries. The 
book also includes advice for stakeholders like politicians, the media, and citizens 
about how to deal with the challenge of populist political communication. 
 This enlightening volume is ‘populist’ in the best sense and will be an 
essential text for any scholar in political science, communication science, media 
studies, sociology, and philosophy with an interest in populism and political 
communication. It does not assume specialist knowledge and will remain accessible 
and engaging to students, practitioners, and policymakers. 
 Carsten Reinemann is a professor of political communication and head of the 
Department of Media and Communication at Ludwig-Maximilians-University 
Munich, Germany. His research interests include populism, extremism, political 
journalism, and media eff ects. 
 James Stanyer is a professor of communication and media analysis, School of Social 
Sciences, Loughborough University, UK. His work has appeared in a wide range 
of academic journals, and he is the author of  Intimate Politics (2013),  Modern 
Political Communication (2007), and  The Creation of Political News (2001). 
 Toril Aalberg is a professor and head of the Department of Sociology and Political 
Science at Norwegian University of Science and Technology in Trondheim, 
Norway. Her research interests include comparative politics, election campaigns, 
how media aff ects public opinion, the relationship between media and politics, and 
the role of stereotypes. 
 Frank Esser is a professor of international and comparative media research at the 
University of Zurich, Switzerland. His research focuses on cross-national studies 
of news journalism and political communication. 
 Claes H. de Vreese is a professor and chair of political communication at the 
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR), University of 
Amsterdam, the Netherlands. His research focuses on political journalism, 
populism, news media eff ects, and public opinion. 
 Routledge Studies in Media, Communication, 
and Politics 
 Digitizing Democracy 
 Edited by Aljosha Karim Schapals, Axel Bruns, and Brian McNair 
 Communicating Populism 
 Comparing Actor Perceptions, Media Coverage, and Eff ects on Citizens 
in Europe 
 Edited by Carsten Reinemann, James Stanyer, Toril Aalberg, Frank 
Esser, and Claes H. de Vreese 
 Communicating Populism 
 Comparing Actor Perceptions, 
Media Coverage, and Eff ects 
on Citizens in Europe 
 Edited by Carsten Reinemann, 
James Stanyer, Toril Aalberg, 
Frank Esser, and Claes H. de Vreese 
 First published 2019 
 by Routledge 
 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 
 and by Routledge 
 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 
 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business 
 © 2019 Taylor & Francis 
 The right of Carsten Reinemann, James Stanyer, Toril Aalberg, Frank 
Esser, and Claes H. de Vreese to be identifi ed as the authors of the 
editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has 
been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, 
Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
 With the exception of Chapters 1 and 12, no part of this book may be 
reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, 
mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including 
photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval 
system, without permission in writing from the publishers. 
Chapters 1 and 12 of this book is available for free in PDF format as 
Open Access from the individual product page at www.routledge.com. 
It has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non 
Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.
 Trademark notice : Product or corporate names may be trademarks or 
registered trademarks, and are used only for identifi cation and explanation 
without intent to infringe. 
 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 
 A catalog record for this book has been requested 
 ISBN: 978-1-138-39272-4 (hbk) 
 ISBN: 978-0-429-40206-7 (ebk) 
 Typeset in Sabon 
 by Apex CoVantage, LLC 
 Introduction 
 This chapter focuses on trends in reporting over time. It examines the 
presence of populist key messages in ‘news coverage of immigration’ and 
‘commentaries on current political events’ in European newspapers at 
two points in time, namely spring 2016 and spring 2017. The chapter 
has a twofold aim. First, it will explore similarities and diff erences in 
the populist content of European newspapers between the two periods. 
Second, it identifi es a set of extra-media and intra-media explanatory 
factors contributing to the understanding of the emerging diff erences in a 
year-to-year comparison. 
 The chapter by Blassnig et al. in this volume provides more detailed 
information about the newspaper stories we content-analyzed. Two types 
of stories are analyzed: ‘news articles on immigration’ and ‘editorials com-
menting on current political events’, irrespective of the topic. While the 
chapter by Blassnig et al. pooled and jointly investigated the data from 
2016 and 2017, and the chapter by Maurer et al. used only content data 
from 2017, this chapter will evaluate and compare the data from 2016 
and 2017. These two periods are seen as two phases of a news and policy 
cycle that responds to real-world cues. The two phases are understood as 
stages of a crisis, which off er more or less favorable opportunity structures 
for populist discourse ( Moffi  tt, 2015 ). As stated in the introduction to 
this volume, a whole range of contextual factors infl uence the populist 
worldview of crises and, subsequently, the use of populist communication 
in news reports and commentaries about theses crises. 
 There were three important contextual factors to consider in our media 
content analysis, namely real-world events (such as migration movements 
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and political responses to them), the role of political actors (such as 
whether populists are involved in government), and public opinion (what 
issues are perceived as problems by the population). The chapter by Mau-
rer et al. demonstrated that there are important country diff erences in the 
use of populist key messages. While Maurer et al.’s cross-sectional data 
analysis focused on the temporally invariant factors of journalistic culture 
and news logic as explanatory factors, in this chapter the focus will be on 
real-world events, political actors, and public opinion, since these factors 
changed between 2016 and 2017. Links to journalistic culture and news 
logic will also be examined where necessary. While real-world events and 
political actors belong to the supply-side conditions of populist commu-
nication, public opinion refers to the demand-side conditions. 
 Theoretical Background 
 Supply and Demand-Side Conditions: Events, 
Politics, and Audience-Driven News 
 As previous studies on the rise of populism have shown, immigration is a 
key source of concern for the general public ( Koopmans & Muis, 2009 ; 
 Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Coenders, 2002 ;  Vliegenthart, 2018 ). Our study 
follows the European refugee crisis, which reached a fi rst high point in the 
fall of 2015. In many countries, right-wing populist actors in particular 
used popular fears as an opportunity to raise their profi le in electoral con-
tests ( Pisoiu & Ahmed, 2016 ;  Wodak, 2015 ). One example is Bulgaria, 
where the leader of the conservative party GERB, Boyko Borissov, used 
immigration for his election campaign in spring 2017 and subsequently 
formed a government coalition with the right-wing populist party United 
Patriots. Another example is Matteo Salvini, leader of the Northern 
League and, from 2018, Deputy Prime Minister in a government coalition 
with the 5 Star Movement in Italy. His campaign wins in the 2018 Italian 
election were also due to his use of populist, anti-immigrant rhetoric. 
 In line with previous research on immigration news and mediated 
populism, the expectation is that country diff erences in media coverage 
are related to supply and demand-side factors ( Eberl et al., 2018 ;  Esser, 
Stępińska, & Hopmann, 2017 ;  Reinemann, Aalberg, Esser, Strömbäck, & 
de Vreese, 2017 ;  Vliegenthart, 2018 ; see also the introduction to this 
volume). So-called event-driven and policy-driven models for explaining 
news content react to supply-side factors, while audience-driven models 
for explaining news content refer to the relevance of demand-side factors. 
 With regard to  event-driven news , it has long been demonstrated ( Peter, 
2003 ) that journalism is contingent upon real-world conditions. Journalists 
interact with political events and sources when writing news items or com-
mentaries and focus on those that help them construct compelling stories. 
The event environment is relevant insofar as journalists regularly attribute 
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news values to various aspects of political reality. The chapter by Maurer 
et al. demonstrated that journalists prefer those political events which they 
regard to be newsworthy, and they enrich them with elements of news logic 
and journalistic culture. Political reality, transformed by journalists for the 
sake of increasing attention, off ers populist actors a favorable entry point 
into the news cycle to disseminate their ideas to the public. 
 Politics-driven news suggests that powerful political actors and their 
policies and strategic maneuvers determine the media agenda ( Wolfsfeld, 
2011 , pp. 1–44). News and commentaries are infl uenced by so-called 
primary defi ners to whom journalists preferentially turn to in their search 
for orientation, original insights, and authoritative interpretations of 
social reality. Populist actors in privileged positions (e.g., media darlings, 
survey winners, strongest party, government participants) also benefi t 
from this.  Mazzoleni (2008 ) claims that the often seamless integration 
of populist messages in editorial decisions and media content is due to a 
sort of media complicity, namely, a certain dependence of the media on 
charismatic fi gures, provocative rhetoric, and mobilizable issues. In this 
chapter, however, we also want to focus on audience-driven models for 
explaining news content. 
 Audience-driven models assign the audience a signifi cant role in the 
formation of the news agenda. This model assumes that certain events 
and policies attract public attention and interest. This, in turn, infl uences 
subsequent media coverage because it corresponds with the professional 
aspirations and economic necessities of journalism to respond to the con-
cerns and anxieties of its audience. While there are some topics that can 
be better explained with media-centered perspectives of agenda-building, 
there are other topics for which audience-driven models should be con-
sidered ( Uscinski, 2009 ). An audience-driven model would expect that it 
is the public perception of problems, rather than the underlying events 
directly, that have an infl uence on journalistic decisions when writing 
news articles and commentaries on these problems—including the ques-
tion of how much populism goes into the story. 
 We will examine our data to discover which of these three explanatory 
models for changes in populism reporting off er the most evidence. We 
cannot statistically test the validity of these three explanations in a strict 
sense, but we can draw plausibility conclusions. Therefore, we refrain 
from hypothesis testing and limit ourselves to research questions: 
 How does the extent of populism in the news and commentaries of 
European newspapers in 2016 and 2017 relate to supply-side conditions 
(expressed in immigration trends and the role of populist parties) (RQ1)? 
 How does the degree of populism in immigration news and politi-
cal commentaries relate to demand-side conditions, more precisely 
to citizens’ perceptions of the issue of immigration and citizens’ 
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assessment of the overall course of the country in 2016 and 2017 
(expressed in survey responses) (RQ2)? 
 In addition, another theoretical possibility should be considered. 
Recall that the chapter by Maurer et al. found, in their cross-sectional 
analysis, that it is not so much  extra-media contextual conditions, but 
rather  intra-media conditions of journalistic working modes (profes-
sional culture, news logic) that best explain populism in news and com-
mentaries. Our longitudinal analysis may also fi nd evidence for this; 
therefore we must ask: 
 How does the degree of populism in immigration news and politi-
cal commentaries in 2016 and 2017 relate to intra-media aspects of 
journalistic work (expressed in reporting practices) (RQ3)? 
 While politics-driven news mainly focuses on the importance of pop-
ulist parties in national government policy (we will discuss this later), 
events-driven news focuses on immigration fi gures and audience-driven 
news on public opinion moods. We start with background information 
on the latter two aspects. 
 Events and Their Perception 
 To understand the perception of events, we must fi rst turn to events them-
selves. To provide an idea of the migration dynamics in Europe during our 
study period,  Table 7.1 presents the offi  cial numbers of refugees recorded 
by the EU for the ten countries that will be examined in more detail below. 
 Table 7.1 Eurostat data on asylum and fi rst time asylum applicants (raw numbers) 
 Country  2015  2016  2017 
 Bulgaria  20,365  19,420  3,695 
 Czech Republic  1,515  1,475  1,445 
 Germany  476,510  745,155  222,560 
 Greece  13,205  51,110  58,650 
 Israel  –  –  – 
 Italy  83,540  122,960  128,850 
 Norway  31,110  3,485  3,520 
 Poland  12,190  12,305  5,045 
 Serbia  –  –  – 
 Switzerland  39,445  27,140  18,015 
 Source:  http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asyappctza&lang=en . 
Notes : No EU data available for Israel and Serbia. 
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 According to Eurostat data (of which  Table 7.1 presents an extract), 
more than one million people migrated to the European Union, via the 
Mediterranean, in 2015. A total of 848,000 took the Balkan route and 
fi rst arrived in Greece; 153,000 took the central Mediterranean route and 
landed in Italy. In 2015, 1,294,000 people applied for asylum in Europe, 
and 1,260,000 in 2016. By far the most applications for asylum were 
fi led in Germany. Observers attested that the EU had temporarily lost 
control in the context of rising fi gures and the lack of regulation. There 
was no orderly registration and distribution of refugees. Critics attrib-
uted a signifi cant share of the increase in the number of asylum seekers 
to German Chancellor Angela Merkel, whose public statements in 2015 
could be regarded as suspending the Dublin Regulation (setting rules for 
registering and distributing asylum seekers in the EU) and ‘inviting’ refu-
gees to Europe. An initially widespread refugee welcome mood gave way 
to a more critical mood among the population. 
 In the wake of the refugee crisis, the issue of immigration made a huge 
leap on the list of concerns held by EU citizens. While in autumn 2014 
only 25 percent of EU citizens saw immigration as an important prob-
lem for the EU, in autumn 2015, at the peak of the refugee crisis, it was 
58 percent. The Eurobarometer asks citizens regularly, ‘What do you 
think are the two most important issues facing the European Union at the 
moment’ and ‘facing your country at the moment’. In spring 2016—at 
the time of the fi rst wave of our media content analysis—the proportions 
of citizens by country who regarded immigration as a central problem  for 
the EU were Bulgaria: 57 percent, Czech Republic: 67 percent, Germany: 
57 percent, Greece: 40 percent, Italy: 44 percent, and Poland: 51 percent 
(no data available for Israel, Norway, Serbia, and Switzerland in Euroba-
rometer no. 85). EU citizens also answered the same question in relation 
to  their own country , and the approval rates for immigration as a  major 
national problem are shown in  Table 7.2 . 
 From the point of view of populism research, the question naturally 
arises as to whether citizens in those countries in which immigration is 
perceived as a pressing national problem will doubt the ability of the 
political elite to solve those problems (indicating anti-elitism). The Euro-
barometer regularly asks whether EU citizens have the impression ‘that, 
in general, things are going in the right direction or in the wrong direc-
tion’ in their home country. A high level of approval for ‘in the wrong 
direction’ expresses public dissatisfaction with the political situation and—
importantly—those responsible for it.  Table 7.3 shows the fi ndings for 
those countries included in the content analysis. Public dissatisfaction with 
national institutions and political leaders has a connection with societal 
pessimism and anti-elitist populism ( Steenvoorden & Harteveld, 2018 ). In 
other words, in a country where the public is dissatisfi ed with the course 
of national institutions and political decision-makers to date, the chances 
of populist communication in politics and the media are likely to increase. 
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 Table 7.2  Eurobarometer question whether citizens perceive immigration as one 
of the two most important issues ‘facing their country’ at the moment 
(agreement in percent) 










 Bulgaria  8  21  13  29  15 
 Czech Republic  18  47  32  25  23 
 Germany  46  76  56  45  37 
 Greece  11  20  20  15  12 
 Israel  –  –  –  –  – 
 Italy  31  30  28  42  36 
 Norway  –  –  –  –  – 
 Poland  9  17  16  11  16 
 Serbia  3  14  6  7  8 
 Switzerland  36 a  –  26 a  –  11 a 
 Source: Standard Eurobarometer no. 84 (2015), 85 (2016), 86 (2016), 87 (2017). 
 Notes : No Eurobarometer data available for Israel, Norway, or Switzerland. 
 a For Switzerland, data from the Credit Suisse Barometer of Concerns was added. 
 Table 7.3  Eurobarometer question whether citizens believe that things are going 
in the right or in the wrong direction in their country; agreement with 
‘in the wrong direction’ in percent 










 Bulgaria  49  49  53  66  58 
 Czech Republic  30  39  40  49  47 
 Germany  30  48  46  40  39 
 Greece  49  77  86  92  89 
 Israel  –  –  –  –  – 
 Italy  52  51  53  70  65 
 Norway  –  –  –  –  – 
 Poland  37  27  50  55  46 
 Serbia  34  36  41  45  46 
 Switzerland  –  –  –  –  – 
 Source: Standard Eurobarometer no. 84 (2015), 85 (2016), 86 (2016), 87 (2017). 
 Notes : No Eurobarometer data available for Israel, Norway, or Switzerland. 
 We will return to the fi ndings from  Table 7.1 when we search for an 
explanatory basis for event-driven news, and we will return to  Tables 7.2 
and  7.3 when we search for an explanatory basis for audience-driven 
news. All three tables should help us to answer  RQs 1 and  2 by linking 
them to our media content analysis data. 
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 Method 
 With regard to the central parameters of the design of our media content 
analysis, please refer to the chapter by Blassnig et al. In that chapter you 
will fi nd more information on the composition of the sample of newspa-
pers and stories, our operationalization of populism and populist key mes-
sages, and the reliability of our content-analytical measurements across 
coders and countries. In the present chapter, we focus on a comparison 
over time, but in contrast to the previous two content analysis chapters, 
we must exclude France and the United Kingdom because their newspa-
pers were not examined in 2016, only in 2017. 
 To calculate the extent of populist communication in European press 
coverage over time, we use the same overall populism sum index as 
described in Blassnig et al.’s chapter in this volume. It can assume val-
ues from 0 to 4. A value of 0 means that no populist key message was 
contained in any of the analyzed stories. A value of 4 would mean that 
each story analyzed contained key messages from all four dimensions of 
populism (anti-elitism, people-centrism, restoring national sovereignty, 
and exclusion of others). Accordingly, a value of 0.5 means that every 
second story contained key messages of at least one dimension. 
 Results 
 Event and Politics-Driven Populism in the Media, 2016–2017 
 Table 7.4 provides an overview of how often newspapers in the ten 
European countries analyzed have supplemented their news reports on 
immigration with populist key messages in 2016 and 2017. However, the 
fi ndings of  Table 7.4 are not interpreted in isolation, but in combination 
with the fi ndings from  Tables 7.5 and  7.6 , which help us to maintain an 
overall picture and avoid the danger of obscuring the true picture. 
 Table 7.5 shows how often European newspapers have also used pop-
ulist key messages in their commentaries on political events. In order to 
be able to interpret  Table 7.4 meaningfully, it is of further interest to 
discover what the most frequently discussed topics were in the news-
paper commentaries. This is shown in  Table 7.6 , which lists the three 
most commented on topics in 2016 and 2017 (we have recorded an addi-
tional 20 topics, but they were much rarer); in addition, the table shows 
how strongly the newspaper commentaries presented these three topics 
in a populist way.  Table 7.6 reveals that immigration was the most com-
mented on topic in 2016; in the following year, 2017, most comments 
were about Europe and the question of whether it can meet its challenges. 
 With regard to the fi rst research question, there are links between 
the frequency with which the topic of immigration is discussed in news 
items and commentaries using populist key messages—and the presence 
of refugees and populist actors in the respective countries. For example, 
 Table 7.4  Frequency of populist key messages in news stories about immigration 
in 2016 and 2017, expressed as mean values of the populism index 
 Country  2016  2017  Diff erence in 
means between 
both periods  M  SD  M  SD 
 Bulgaria  0.53  0.57  0.77  0.60  +0.24 
 Czech Republic  0.44  0.58  0.32  0.55  –0.12 
 Germany  0.79  0.78  0.76  0.83  –0.03 
 Greece  0.75  0.64  0.57  0.69  –0.18 
 Israel  1.0  0.98  0.71  0.86  –0.29 
 Italy  0.23  0.46  0.30  0.58  +0.07 
 Norway  0.20  0.43  0.19  0.39  –0.01 
 Poland  0.60  0.55  1.0  0.63  +0.40 
 Serbia  0.32  0.54  0.11  0.32  –0.21 
 Switzerland  0.47  0.57  0.47  0.59  0.0 
 Total  0.53  0.61  0.52  0.60  –0.01 
 Notes: M = mean;  SD = standard deviation. Number of key messages analyzed:  N (2016) = 
761,  N (2017) = 762. Periods of media content analyses were spring 2016 (February to 
April) and spring 2017 (February to April). 
 Table 7.5  Frequency of populist key messages in commentaries in 2016 and 2017, 
expressed as mean values of the populism index 
 Country  2016  2017  Diff erence in 
means between 
both periods  M  SD  M  SD 
 Bulgaria  0.64  0.71  0.68  0.87  +0.04 
 Czech Republic  0.52  0.62  0.23  0.48  –0.29 
 Germany  0.80  0.68  0.86  0.67  +0.08 
 Greece  0.95  0.53  0.98  0.61  +0.03 
 Israel  1.17  0.75  1.15  0.81  –0.02 
 Italy  0.36  0.51  0.40  0.54  +0.04 
 Norway  0.22  0.48  0.19  0.39  –0.03 
 Poland  0.96  0.47  1.17  0.52  +0.21 
 Serbia  0.76  0.69  0.59  0.62  –0.20 
 Switzerland  0.83  0.76  0.59  0.67  –0.21 
 Total  0.72  0.62  0.68  0.62  –0.04 
 Notes: M = mean;  SD = standard deviation. Number of key messages in commentaries 
analyzed:  N (2016) = 588,  N (2017) = 632. Periods of media content analyses were spring 
2016 (February to April) and spring 2017 (February to April). 
Event-, Politics-, and Audience-Driven News 131
the high populist values of German and Greek newspapers in their news 
( Table 7.4 ) and commentaries on immigration and Europe ( Table 7.6 ) 
can be interpreted as a reaction to the many arriving refugees and the 
associated political challenges in the context of an unenforced Dublin 
Regulation. On the other hand, in countries where the number of refu-
gees had been restricted rapidly (e.g., Norway; see  Table 7.1 ), the propor-
tion of populism in immigration news and commentaries was low (see 
 Tables 7.4 and  7.5 ). In Serbia, where few immigrants stopped during the 
refugee crisis, immigration never became a big topic for the media. 
 The fi nding that reporting on immigration is higher in the regions 
more aff ected by it has been well corroborated in research literature. For 
example,  Dunaway, Branton, and Abrajano (2010 ) found, for the United 
States, that media attention to immigration is greater in border states 
than in non-border states. In view of the high populist values for German 
and Greek newspapers in 2016, however, it is rather the populism-using 
reporting of the immigration issue that can be explained in this way. A 
similarly high trend of populism-infused coverage could also have been 
expected for Italy. However, although public concern about rising immi-
gration fl ows and media coverage of the immigration issue was high in 
2016–2017, Italian newspapers were reluctant to use populist key mes-
sages ( Tables 7.4 and  7.5 ). At the same time, however, these newspapers 
focused strongly on tightening immigration controls on boat traffi  c with 
Libya and tightening the naturalization law for babies born to foreigners 
in Italy, as was revealed upon closer scrutiny of Italian news stories and 
commentaries. 
 In the newspapers of the three countries most aff ected by arriving 
refugees (Germany, Greece, and Italy), it is striking that the populist 
 Table 7.6  The three most frequently addressed topics in the commentaries of 
European newspapers, and the combination of these topics with popu-
list key messages 
 Topic  Frequency N (%)  Overall populism 
index (mean) 
 2016  2017  Year-to-year 
diff erence 
 2016  2017  Diff erence 
in means 
 Immigration  149 (15%)  86 (9%)  –6%  0.80  0.63  –0.23 
 Societal values 
and norms 
 124 (13%)  124 (13%)  0%  0.83  0.75  –0.08 
 Europe  111 (12%)  131 (13%)  +1%  0.80  0.78  –0.02 
 Notes: Up to three topics per commentary could be coded; frequencies were summed up. 
Missing data to 100 percent concern commentaries on other topics which we have not 
listed here for reasons of clarity. 
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coloration of their reporting was not determined by xenophobic, exclu-
sionary messages, but by anti-elitist statements (on the prominence of 
anti-elitist media coverage, see also Blassnig et al.’s chapter in this vol-
ume). This is particularly noticeable in the case of Greece. In 2016, the 
Greek newspapers voiced their criticism of an ineff ective ‘EU relocation 
and resettlement scheme’, which would not bring relief due to the refusal 
of many EU states to accept Greek and Italian immigrants. They also criti-
cized the ‘EU Turkey refugee deal’, which would not bring relief due to 
various problems between Greece and Turkey at the time. The anti-elitist 
criticism by Greek newspapers was also directed against Brussels because 
its ‘Dublin III regulation’ would contribute to even more catastrophic 
conditions in Greece’s already overburdened fi rst-time reception centers, 
by returning refugees back to them from countries such as Germany. 
Between 2016 and 2017, the use of exclusionary populist statements in 
immigration news and commentaries decreased in all countries studied—
including those countries most aff ected by new arrivals—whereas anti-
elitist statements predominated. 1 
 Other countries revealed a diff erent pattern. This brings us to Euro-
pean countries where immigration fi gures were low and were reduced 
even further from 2016 to 2017, but the degree of mediated populism 
was high, and increased even further from 2016 to 2017. This applies, 
for example, to Bulgaria and Poland (see  Tables 7.1 ,  7.4 , and  7.5 ). Here 
the reporting obviously does not react to the actual immigration, but 
rather to what populist actors have done with the topic (politics-driven 
news instead of event-driven news). As previously mentioned, Bulgarian 
populists took advantage of the issue in their 2017 general election cam-
paign. In countries with strong populist actors, some of whom had gov-
ernmental responsibility (this includes Poland, Israel, and Switzerland), 
news and commentary reacted more strongly to the handling of events by 
politicians than to the genuine events themselves. 
 In summary, to answer  RQ1 there was some tentative evidence of a 
connection between (1) the extent of populism in the news and com-
mentaries of European newspapers in 2016 and 2017 and (2) supply-side 
conditions, in this case immigration events and political actions. 
 Audience-Driven Populism in the Media, 2016–2017 
 The topic of immigration is such that an audience-driven eff ect on news 
content can be expected. Certain problems stimulate public interest and 
awareness to such an extent that for professional and economic reasons, 
journalists feel compelled to respond in news and commentary ( Uscinski, 
2009 ). The second research question asks how citizens’ perceptions of 
immigration as an important issue and their assessment of the overall 
course of the country relate to the subsequent populism-infused reporting 
of immigration. 
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 The data in  Figure 7.1 give us initial indications that there may be paral-
lels between longer-term trends in the public perception of the immigra-
tion problem and longer-term trends in news reporting on immigration. It 
would be wrong to overstretch the data, but what  Figure 7.1 reveals can 
be seen below (countries with diff erent or missing data sources cannot be 
considered). 
 In countries where there has been an increase in the public percep-
tion of immigration as an urgent problem, there has been an increase in 
populism-using reporting on the issue over the same period. According to 
Eurobarometer data in  Table 7.2 , the increase in the perceived importance 
of the topic between spring 2016 and spring 2017 was +2 for Bulgaria 
and +8 for Italy, and the increase in reporting over the same period was 
+24 for Bulgaria and +8 for Italy (according to  Table 7.4 ). Correspond-
ingly, we fi nd that in countries where concerns about immigration among 
the population decreased between spring 2016 and spring 2017 (Czech 
Republic –9, Germany –19, Greece –8), populist coverage of immigration 
also decreased (Czech Republic –12, Germany –3, Greece –18). 
 Audience Perceptions, Events, and Media Examined 
Together, 2016–2017 
 The fi ndings presented in  Figure 7.1 can only be considered a weak indi-
cation of the audience-driven model for explaining news content. An 
alternative is to compare relevant data from 2016 and 2017 and check 
their correlative relationships more comprehensively by integrating other 
 Figure 7.1  Co-development of populism in migration news and perceived salience 
of immigration among citizens/the audience (diff erence between 2016 
and 2017 in %) 
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relevant variables into a systematic overall model. We constructed such a 
model with the data provided in the previous tables, and we off er a graph-
ical presentation of it in  Figure 7.2 . The model includes data from Bul-
garia, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, Poland, Serbia, 
and Switzerland. Where data from Eurostat or Eurobarometer was not 
available, the cases were excluded on a case-by-case basis. The correla-
tions between the cases were calculated using Pearson coeffi  cients. Where 
for logical reasons there can only be one-sided infl uence relationships, 
we worked with one-sided signifi cance tests (represented by → arrows); 
where there can be two-sided infl uence relationships, we used two-sided 
signifi cance tests (represented by ↔ arrows). 
 Figure 7.2 has three levels: events, perceptions, and media. On the level 
of perceptions—at the center of the chart—two variables of the audience-
driven model are located: ‘share of citizens perceiving immigration as a 
major national issue’ 2 and ‘share of citizens expressing dissatisfaction with 
the direction of the country and political decision makers’. 3 According to 
the assumptions of the audience-driven model, the perceived salience 
of the immigration issue and the widespread anxiety and political dissatis-
faction (of the public) is seen as a cause for populism-infused immigration 
reporting or populism-infused commentary on the current political situa-
tion (by journalists). While the fi rst variable suggests that journalists react 
to the topic of immigration (and its implications) with people-centrist and 
perhaps even exclusionary key messages, the second variable suggests that 
anti-elitist and perhaps even national-sovereigntist messages will also be 
included in the coverage. 
 At the highest level,  Figure 7.2 also takes into account real-world events 
which are likely to infl uence the perceptions of the population on one 
hand, and media coverage on the other. As reality cues, we have included 
the ‘number of arriving asylum applications in country’ 4 as a potential 
infl uencing factor. Finally, at the lowest level of  Figure 7.2 , we fi nd media 
coverage broken down by the two indicators, ‘populist key messages in 
commentaries on current political issues’ 5 and ‘populist key messages in 
news coverage on immigration’. 6 
 How do we interpret the fi ndings of  Figure 7.2 ? Our interest in the 
audience-driven model fi rst draws our attention to paths (2), (3), and (4). 
They tell us that journalists using populist key messages in 2016 were 
equally responsive to the population’s concerns about the immigration 
issue (2) and to citizens’ dissatisfaction with directional decisions taken 
by political elites (3, 4). These audience-driven infl uences are only margin-
ally weaker than real-world infl uences, i.e., the actual number of arriving 
refugees (path 1), on the use of populist messages in the immigration 
news. However, all mentioned infl uences of the paths (1) to (4) are only 
between  r = .41 and  r = .51; they are comparatively low and insignifi cant 
in a statistical sense. The soft evidence for audience-driven news presented 
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model of  Figure 7.2 . In other words, neither for 2016, nor 2017, do the 
correlations in  Figure 7.2 give us statistically signifi cant indications that 
journalists’ use of populist messages in news or commentaries is related 
to audience-driven processes. 
 Events, on the other hand, have a greater infl uence than the audience. 
The number of arriving asylum applicants in a country in 2016 and 2017 
largely determined the share of citizens perceiving immigration to be a 
major national issue in 2016 (path 5) and 2017 (paths 6 and 7). How-
ever, the infl uence of immigration fi gures on the extent of populism in 
the immigration news coverage remained very weak both in 2016 and 
2017 (paths 1 and 8). While  Tables 7.4 and  7.5 had found soft evidence 
for the validity of the event-driven news model in some selected countries 
(e.g., Germany and Greece), this infl uence disappears when all countries 
are considered together (as in  Figure 7.2 ). 
 According to  Figure 7.2 , the best explanation for events, audience per-
ceptions, and media coverage in the year 2017 was the previous condi-
tions of 2016. The highly signifi cant autocorrelations of paths (9), (10), 
(11), (12), and (13) indicate that conditions in the various countries did 
not develop arbitrarily, but followed path-dependent patterns. Political 
decisions on how many asylum seekers are allowed into the country have 
evolved as consistently as public opinion and the practices of national 
news organizations. 
 A Deeper Look at the Role of the Media 
 This seemingly great consistency in news organization practices deserves a 
closer look—and it brings us to our third research question. The fact that 
we fi nd hardly any noteworthy evidence in  Figure 7.2 for the assumptions 
of the event-driven and audience-driven model to explain  populism in 
media coverage draws our attention to the explanatory factor introduced 
by  RQ3 , namely, intra-media aspects of journalistic work. 
 Indeed, the extent of populist key messages in political commentaries 
and immigration news in 2017 is not primarily determined by public 
opinion or the events of the same year, but by processes of journalistic self-
referentiality (see the multiple mutual infl uences at the level of the ‘media’ 
in  Figure 7.2 ). Various scholars such as  Stanyer (2014 ) have pointed to the 
fact that newspapers monitor each other’s coverage closely and respond 
accordingly; they align their reporting and commenting with the practices 
of journalists from other media, or with previous publications of their 
own staff . Inter-media agenda-setting and journalists’ herd behavior can 
infl uence news decisions and editorial positions; processes of professional 
socialization and social control within news organizations can further 
promote convergence of attitudes and practices. In terms of our topic, 
mediated populism may be less determined by extra-media factors and 
more by intra-media factors. 
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 To explain paths (14), (15), and (17),  Schoenbach’s (2008 ) concept of 
synchronizing news and opinion is helpful. In his understanding, ‘syn-
chronization’ means the selection and presentation of news to favor a 
medium’s marked editorial policy or stance. Synchronized news, then, is 
news selected and presented to support a medium’s anti or pro-immigration 
sentiments, for instance, or its liberal or conservative philosophy ( Schoen-
bach, 2008 ). This argument is congruent with  Kepplinger, Brosius, and 
Staab (1991 ) ‘theory of instrumental actualization’. It describes the ten-
dency of journalists to align their news decisions with their previous edito-
rial positions in an attitude-fi tting fashion. Path (16) further indicates that 
journalists rely heavily on examples and events they have covered in the 
news (and their framing) to comment on what is going on in the world. 
This is line with  Scheufele’s (2006 ) work on journalistic framing, which 
argues that journalists set frames with their earlier reporting that infl uence 
their later editorial decisions. 
 Recall that  RQ1 and  2 asked if growing populism in immigration 
news could be a response to immigration-related real-world trends or 
to growing public concerns about immigration and directional decisions 
taken by political elites. The answer is that there is hardly any convinc-
ing empirical evidence for it. This does not mean that the events and 
concerns of the population do not play a role, but rather that they are not 
the main explanatory factors for how much  populism there is in media 
reports. However, the comparison of two time periods further supports 
conclusions we already made in Maurer et al.’s chapter on the basis of 
cross-sectional data analysis—namely, that  intra-media factors such as 
journalistic culture and news logic play a powerful role in explaining 
populism in the news. We can thus answer  RQ3 in the affi  rmative. 
 Discussion and Conclusion 
 This chapter is based on the same content analysis data presented in detail 
in Blassnig et al.’s chapter of this volume. Unlike the previous two chap-
ters, the focus here is on a comparison of 2016 and 2017 in order to 
understand  trends in the use of populist key messages in news articles and 
commentaries. Theoretically speaking, the two periods under study can 
be seen as two phases of a crisis in which diff erent conditions prevailed 
with regard to migration movements, political reactions, and problem 
perceptions of the public. 
 The fi ndings show that the presence of populism in news and commen-
taries in some countries is loosely related to actual migration dynamics (in 
the sense of event-driven news; see Germany and Greece), whereas  in other 
countries it seems to follow more intensive political debates, although 
actual immigration is less dramatic (in the sense of politics-driven news; 
see Bulgaria and Poland). There are fewer indications than expected that 
the populist tendencies in news and commentaries are a reaction to the 
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intensity with which the population views immigration as an important 
national issue or is dissatisfi ed with trend-setting decisions by political elites 
(in the sense of audience-driven news; the weak evidence in  Figures 7.1 
and  7.2 ). Finally, there are strong indications that the great importance 
of intra-media factors in explaining populism in news and commentary—
already highlighted in Maurer et al.’s chapter—are also clearly present in 
our temporal comparison. This is the essential fi nding of  Figure 7.2 . 
 For an overall assessment of the situation, it is also necessary to empha-
size that, on average, there was a decline in populist news and comments 
in all the countries we examined between 2016 and 2017. We attribute this 
primarily to three developments: fi rst, the EU-Turkey deal in March 2016 
and the resulting decline in immigration fi gures; second, political searches 
for solutions at EU and national level (e.g., with regard to dealing with the 
Dublin Regulation); and third, a more refl ective approach by journalists 
to aspects of migration, migration policy, and populism. The last point is 
supported, for example, by the fi nding that the proportion of exclusionist 
populism in the immigration news of all the countries studied decreased 
between 2016 and 2017. 7 However, the decline in populism was also attrib-
utable to a fourth factor, namely the fact that newspapers, which in 2016 
had focused considerably on the international and Europe-wide dimensions 
of the crisis, returned to focusing more on national conditions in 2017. 
 This study also has some limitations, many of which were already dis-
cussed in the chapter by Blassnig et al. However, there are some additional 
restraints specifi cally with regard to the comparison over time. First, we 
are comparing only two time periods that are one year apart. While these 
two waves capture important phases during the European refugee crisis, a 
longer investigation period would have allowed more long-term analyses 
and broader conclusions. Secondly, because internationally standardized data 
was not available for all countries, our investigation of the co-development 
between the perceived salience of immigration in the public and populism 
in migration news had to remain largely descriptive. Thirdly, and in con-
nection with the second point, the path model presented in  Figure 7.2 is 
based on a small sample and its results should therefore be generalized 
only with caution. 
 In conclusion, the fi ndings in this chapter support the theoretical posi-
tion that contextual and situational factors infl uence, in  some countries 
and to  some extent, the use of populist communication in media coverage. 
However, it is mainly intra-media factors that explain the  general develop-
ment of reporting between 2016 and 2017. 
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 Notes 
 1 . These analyses, diff erentiated according to dimensions, are not shown in the 
tables. 
 2. For this, the Eurobarometer data for spring 2016 and spring 2017 from 
Table 7.2 have been included in the calculations. 
 3 . For this, the Eurobarometer data for spring 2016 and spring 2017 from 
Table 7.3 have been included. These periods correspond to the periods of our 
media content analysis. 
 4 . For this, the Eurostat data for 2016 and 2017 from Table 7.1 have been 
included in the calculations. 
 5 . For this, we used the data for 2016 and 2017 from Table 7.4. 
 6 . For this, we used the data for 2016 and 2017 from Table 7.5. 
 7 . See endnote 1. This is an additional fi nding that is not shown in the tables 
above. 
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